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THE IRREDUCIBLY NORMATIVE NATURE 
OF PROVOCATION/PASSIONt 
Stephen J. Morse* 
In his interesting and provocative article, Adequate (Non) Provoca-
tion and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not justification, 1 Professor Reid 
Griffith Fontaine makes important claims. The first is that provoca-
tion/passion must be a partial excuse as an analytic matter. To 
prove this, he points to cases in which provocation/ passion miti-
gated murder to manslaughter even though there was no adequate 
provocation, but only a reasonable or an unreasonable belief that 
provocation had occurred, or in which there was real provocation, 
but the person killed was not the provoker. He also uses an analogy 
to some cases of mistaken self-defense and the lack of entailed 
connection between justified emotion and justified behavior to 
make his argument that provocation/passion analytically must be a 
partial excuse. Finally, although somewhat obscurely, Fontaine 
suggests that analysis of the psychological components of provoca-
tion/passion proves that this doctrine must be a partial excuse. 
I agree with Professor Fontaine that provocation/passion is best 
interpreted as a partial excuse, but the ground for tny conclusion is 
normative and not analytic. Indeed, I fear that he has not made the 
analytic case in large part because he begs a question about failed 
justifications that has only a normative and not an analytic answer. 
This Essay first briefly provides my own understanding of provoca-
tion/passion. In the course of doing so, I address Professor 
Fontaine's argument that provocation/passion should also be ap-
plied to people with provocation interpretational bias.2 I then turn to 
why Fontaine's case for partial excuse is not analytically airtight.3 
t © 2009 by Stephen). Morse. All rights reserved. 
* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law & Professor of Psychology and Law 
in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania. I thank Ed Greenlee for his invaluable help. As 
always, my personal attorney, Jean Avnet Morse, furnished sound, sober counsel and moral 
support. 
1. Reid G. Fontaine, Adequate (Nan)Provocatian and Heat of Passian as Excuse Not justifi-
catian, 43 U. MICH.J.L REFORM 27 (2009). 
2. Id. at 31. For convenience, I will refer to this condition as PIB. 
3. I have many doctrinal quibbles with Professor Fontaine's characterizations and ar-
guments, but these may be more a matter of exposition than of substance. In any case, these 
quibbles do not affect the arguments of this Essay and I shall not address them. 
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I. PROVOCATION/PASSION As A PARTIAL EXCUSE 
What is the best justification for claiming that some people who 
kill intentionally in response to provocation should be found guilty 
only of the lesser homicide crime of voluntary manslaughter? Most 
rational adults understand two aspects of our psychological na-
tures. First, things that happen can make people extremely angry. 
Second, we have much more difficulty behaving rationally when we 
are in states of such extreme emotion or other states that diminish 
rationality. 4 If the provoking circumstances are of the type that 
might make ordinary, average ("reasonable") people angry, then 
being in that state of diminished rationality is not fully the person's 
fault. Indeed, if the provocation is sufficient, we might think that 
the person is not at fault at all for being in this state. Whether we 
think the diminished rationality is partially or fully justified or ex-
cused by the provocation does not seem important at this stage. 
Even if it is justified, which I am inclined to think, that does not 
entail that further action in that state is also justified, as Fontaine 
rightly notes.5 
Sufficiently diminished rationality that is not the agent's fault is 
a classic excusing or mitigating condition. Having the capacity for 
rationality is a traditional criterion for responsibility that explains 
why we mitigate or excuse the wrongdoing of minors and of some 
people with mental abnormalities. Thus, if an agent commits in-
tentional homicide while in that partially or fully innocent state of 
diminished rationality, there is a strong case for mitigation. We can 
argue normatively about what sorts of provocations make dimin-
ished rationality partially or fully innocent and about the degree or 
type of diminished rationality that is sufficient to mitigate. But the 
principled case for mitigation follows from moral and penological 
theories that the law already explicitly or implicitly adopts. 
Does it follow from these impeccable credentials that the law 
must adopt some provocation/passion mitigation? Of course not. 
4. I recognize that it is common in doctrinal and everyday discussion to describe this 
state as one of uloss of control," but I think that this locution is confusing, misleading and 
incapable of operationalization except in terms of diminished rationality. See Stephen ]. 
Morse, UncontroUable Urges and Irrational PeCtple, 88 VA. L. REv. 1025 (2002); Stephen J. Morse 
Against Control Tests fur Criminal Responsibility, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 449 (P. 
Robinson, K Ferzan & S. Garvey eds., 2009). Professor Fontaine asserts that emotional upset 
must be a but-for cause of loss of self control in provocation/passion cases. Fontaine, supra 
note 1, at 45. But no such causal relation must be shown, nor must loss of self-control be 
independently demonstrated. It is sufficient if the defendant simply did kill in the heat of 
passion in response to the provocation. As a result of such potential confusions, I will use 
diminished rationality as the basis for the partial excuse throughout this Essay. 
5. Fontaine, supra note 1, at 48. As I discuss below, this point does not have the ana-
lytic implications that Professor Fontaine claims. 
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A reasonable legislator might vote to abolish it on consequential 
grounds-for example, to maximize deterrence when emotions are 
in play and incapacitate those who show themselves to be danger-
ously liable to the influence of strong emotions. Or the reasonable 
legislator might abolish it on retributive grounds-for example, 
people must be expected to manage the serious consequences of 
their emotions, even if they are predisposed to untoward emotions, 
and they are morally at fault and deserve punishment if they do 
not. Abolishing observed or suspected sexual infidelity as a legally 
adequate provocation reflects both types of reasons, although infi-
delity frequently enrages ordinary people. 
Two questions that arise in response to the partial excuse ac-
count of provocation/passion are why it is not a full excuse and 
why it is limited to homicide. The answer to the first is that the law 
is unforgiving towards diminished rationality claims, especially if 
the diminished rationality is occasioned by the type of strong emo-
tions that are ubiquitous in interpersonal interaction. Even if it is 
not fully the agent's fault that he is enraged, he is expected to 
manage that rage and not to kill. Suppose, however, that the 
provocation is enormous and virtually any agent, no matter how 
morally well-constituted, would have had his capacity for rationality 
vastly undermined, and the defendant was in this state. Such cases 
may not arise frequently, but if they arise, there would be a strong 
case for a full excuse similar to an insanity defense. Cases of so-
called "temporary insanity," which is not an independent doctrine, 
may be a response to precisely these types of cases. 
The answer to the second question is more perplexing. If the ac-
count of partial excuse is accurate, then it seems generic. Imagine 
an adequately provoked and enraged arsonist who immediately 
burns the home of the provoker rather than killing him. In princi-
ple, there is no reason not to furnish the arsonist a partial excuse. It 
may be difficult doctrinally because not all crimes are divided as 
conveniently into degrees as homicide, but the principle is clear and 
this administrative problem could probably be solved doctrinally. 
Moreover, the account of the justification for provocation/passion 
that I provide also suggests that criminal law might justifiably create 
a generic partial responsibility mitigation based on innocent or par-
tially innocent diminished rationality arising from many sources in 
addition to provocation, such as mental abnormalities of various 
kinds.6 
6. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHio ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 289 (2003). 
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Such a proposal has little practical hope of being adopted at 
present, but it provides a useful heuristic with which to judge Pro-
fessor Fontaine's proposal to extend the provocation/passion 
mitigation to killers who apparently demonstrate PIB. Assuming 
that the bias is sufficiently serious, there is a case for arguing that 
such people have diminished rationality. The case is distinguish-
able from provocation/passion because the latter involves normal 
emotions but the former is a cognitive dysfunction. Why should 
this matter, however? In both cases the defendant is not fully at 
fault for being in a state of diminished rationality and in both cases 
there is equal reason to expect the person to manage (or not man-
age) the emotions or misperceptions. Simply because PIB is a 
cognitive dysfunction does not mean that the agent cannot be ex-
pected to recognize that he has a problem and to take steps to 
avoid it. A generic partial responsibility mitigation would have the 
resources to address PIB cases and other cases of diminished ra-
tionality without deforming the criterion of provocation. 
Professor Fontaine should join me in calling for the creation of 
such a doctrine. There would be difficulties creating the precise 
criteria and evaluating individual cases, but this is a constant fea-
ture of excusing standards and a poor reason not to try to achieve 
justice. 
In short, whether the criminal law should retain the provoca-
tion/passion doctrine of partial excuse, whether it should adopt a 
broader mitigating standard, and what the contours of any such 
doctrines should be are irreducibly normative questions. It is a 
matter of how we want to live together. But are we analytically 
committed to a partial excuse theory of provocation/passion? It is 
to that question that the next section turns. 
II. Is PRovocATION/PASSION NECESSARILY A PARTIAL ExcusE 
RATHER THAN A PARTIALjUSTIFICATION? 
This section begins by providing the strongest possible argument 
for why provocation/passion is entirely or partially a partial justifi-
cation. Any claim that analytically it cannot be a partial justification 
will not be persuasive unless it logically defeats the strongest claim 
that it is. The section then turns to the various arguments Professor 
Fontaine raises and tests their logic against the strongest claim for 
partial justification. 
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A. Provocation/Passion As A Partial justification 
The provocations that traditionally sufficed as legally adequate 
all involve a serious moral and sometimes legal injury or wrong to 
the defendant. Mutual combat, injury to a family member, seeing 
an Englishman deprived of his rights, and, most famously, discover-
ing one's spouse in the act of infidelity are serious violations of the 
duties we owe each other. Even in jurisdictions that have a more 
permissive standard, exemplified by the English rule,7 the provoca-
tion must be sufficiently severe to arouse the "heat of passion" in 
the ordinary reasonable person. Although Professor Fontaine 
rightly notes the variation among jurisdictions concerning the cri-
teria for provocation, he does not and cannot deny that the 
mitigation requires a provocation and that the provocation must 
always be serious. 
The prime counterexample is the Model Penal Code's "extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance" doctrine (EMED),8 which does 
not require any provocation whatsoever, but this is definitely not a 
common law provocation/ passion doctrine and no one would 
deny that it is fully a partial excuse. One cannot use its existence to 
buttress the argument that provocation/passion must be a partial 
excuse because it is a distinguishable doctrine. The Model Penal 
Code provision is also applicable to reckless homicides, further dis-
tinguishing it from provocation/ passion, which applies only to 
intentional homicide. One can in part infer from the American Law 
Institute's substitution of this doctrine for provocation/passion that 
the A.L.I. recognized the ambiguities and insufficiency of provoca-
tion/passion as a partial excuse. Finally, it is scant consolation for 
Professor Fontaine's position that this doctrine has gained such 
limited acceptance and has been repealed by many states that 
adopted it. 
In short, the provocation required by the provocation/passion 
mitigation must always be a serious physical, psychological or eco-
nomic wrong. And note that many jurisdictions are not permissive 
and retain the traditional categories. Hence, the provoker certainly 
deserves a serious return for his wrongful behavior. 9 The provoker 
does not deserve to die, but he does deserve a just desert. 
The necessity of serious provocation prima facie establishes the 
partialjustification explanation for provocation/passion mitigation. 
7. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.). 
8. MODEL PENAL ConE§ 210.3(l)(b) (1962). 
9. Andrew J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 292, 307-08 
( 1976) ("[A] n individual is to same extent morally justified in making a punitive return against 
someone who intentionally causes him serious offence .... "). 
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But it appears that this prima facie case is rebutted by the further 
requirement that the killing must be done in the subjective heat of 
passion, which Professor Fontaine, following Professor Joshua 
Dressler, 10 claims establishes that the doctrine is primarily about the 
emotions. This appearance is deceptive, however. If the killer is not 
angry, that might well indicate that the killer was not particularly 
provoked and that the wrong done was not the primary reason for 
the homicide. Mter all, a partial justification requires that the de-
fendant acted for the partially justifying reason. Sometimes a 
defendant can act without a genuinely justifying motivation even if 
the defendant is reasonably aware that he has one. Imagine a de-
fendant who recognizes accurately that his worst enemy is about to 
try to kill him. The defendant believes that he is quicker on the 
draw than his enemy and kills the enemy because he hates the en-
emy and not because he wants to save his own life. It is an open 
question whether this defendant should have available the justifica-
tion of self-defense even though he was the would-be victim of 
imminent, wrongful deadly force.11 
Heat of passion may be a standard evidentiary rule to establish 
genuine justifying motivation because it would be difficult to iden-
tify "cold anger" cases. Probably few adequately provoked people 
are not angered, however, and the anger is clearly justified even if 
the killing is not. The victim of provocation has been seriously 
wronged. Terming provocation/ passion a concession to the frailty 
of human nature does not dispose of the question of whether the 
doctrine is one of justification or excuse. Frail human nature ex-
plains wrongful action whether arising from partial excuse or 
partial justification. The good person does not kill even if terribly 
provoked. 
Even if the argument for heat of passion as a proxy for the justi-
ficatory motive is unconvincing, a second argument exists for the 
partial justification view. Perhaps provocation/ passion is a mixed 
mitigation that requires both that the victim deserved some return 
and that the defendant acted in a state of diminished rationality 
when he made it. This is distinguishable from Professor Fontaine's 
characterization of "alternating" theories for the doctrine and it 
does not mean that there are two necessarily independent defenses 
that have been illogically collapsed into one. 12 It is perfectly coher-
ent to view each type of explanation as necessary but only jointly 
10. Joshua S. Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Difense?: Some .&jlections on a Difficult 
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REv. 959 (2002). 
11. I return infra to such cases and the role they must play in Professor Fontaine's ar-
gument. 
12. Fontaine, supra note 1, at 42 n.50. 
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sufficient. If this were true, it would explain the contours of the 
doctrine that have vexed courts and commentators alike. Fontaine 
is incorrect when he implies that heat of passion has no place in a 
partial justification doctrine. 13 Indeed, Professor Fontaine explicitly 
recognizes the possibility of a mixed defense. 14 There is nothing 
illogical or incoherent about considering provocation/passion as a 
mixed mitigation. 
B. Professor Fontaine's Argument That Provocation/ 
Passion Must Be a Partial Excuse 
Professor Fontaine does not deny that provocation/passion ab 
initio might logically be a partial justification (although this is in 
some tension with the argument that the partial excuse view is ana-
lytic). Rather, he claims that the partial justification account is flatly 
inconsistent with the law and thus provocation/passion must be a 
partial excusing condition. To support this claim, Fontaine first 
usefully creates a taxonomy (for which we are in his debt) of com-
mon law decisions that are apparently inconsistent with the 
justification account. For example, he notes that it seems inconsis-
tent to permit the justification in cases in which the victim is 
known to be neither the provoker nor closely associated with the 
provoker. There are jurisdictions that do not allow the mitigation 
in this case, however. As Fontaine candidly admits,15 the validity of 
the partial excuse account is not entailed by the observation that 
some jurisdictions are fully aligned with it. I would go further. Even 
if all jurisdictions interpreted the doctrine to be fully consistent 
with partial excuse and fully inconsistent with partial justification, 
this would not logically entail that the doctrine is in theory neces-
sarily a partial excuse. It would require only the conclusion that all 
American jurisdictions normatively prefer an excuse version of the 
doctrine and interpret it accordingly. 
Some of the cases that Professor Fontaine believes are inconsis-
tent with the justification theory are in fact inconsistent only if the 
jurisdiction has already made a previous normative choice. For ex-
ample, consider the case of the provoked defendant w:ho 
reasonably believes he was provoked but in fact there was no actual 
provocation.16 The defendant made an honest and reasonable mis-
take. On a few occasions, Fontaine raises the issue of a mistaken 
13. /d. at 47. 
14. /d. at 44 n.56. 
15. /d. at 41-42. 
16. /d. at 33-34. 
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defendant who honestly and reasonably believes that his action is 
justified. Sometimes he is inconclusive about whether the defen-
dant is justified or excused in such cases17 and at other times he 
simply asserts the conclusion that such defendants are excused or 
partially excused. 18 Fontaine never argues for a normative position 
on this vexing question, which has divided legal scholars without 
resolution in sight. Thus, the inconsistency arises from the explicit 
or implicit normative choice to treat an honest and reasonable 
mistake as excusing rather than justifying. 
I firmly believe that such agents are justified because I adopt a 
particular, normative view of the action-guiding nature of criminal 
law rules. 19 An agent who acts entirely reasonably for a justificatory 
reason has done all that any decent society can expect of him and 
therefore he is justified despite the regrettable mistake. He has 
done nothing wrong. Those who disagree, including, apparently, 
Professor Fontaine, are not illogical or incoherent, but neither is 
the view I defend. It is a normative choice. If one concludes that 
the reasonably mistaken agent is justified, then permitting the rea-
sonably mistaken provoked and passionate agent to succeed with 
provocation/passion is not inconsistent with the partial justifica-
tion version of the doctrine. 
Professor Fontaine cites two cases, HowelfO and Mauricio, 21 for the 
proposition that provocation/passion is permissible in cases of un-
reasonable mistake about provocation, but neither case stands for 
the proposition. The facts in both might have raised the issue, but 
neither addressed it. In Mauricio, the issue of intoxication was 
raised only in connection with New Jersey's rule concerning when 
voluntary intoxication would be admitted to negate mens rea. This 
part of the court's discussion was entirely independent of the rela-
tion between voluntary intoxication and provocation/passion. 
Let us assume, however, that there was support in these cases for 
the permissibility of using an honest but unreasonable mistake 
about justification as a basis for provocation/passion. An honest 
but unreasonable belief about justification, "failed justification," is 
a traditional mitigating condition. It can be taken into account at 
sentencing, and its most obvious doctrinal expression is "imperfect 
self defense," which in some jurisdictions reduces an intentional 
17. E.g., id. at 50-51. 
18. E.g., id. at 36, 44 n.56, 45 n.58. 
19. Stephen]. Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 
363, 405-09. 
20. Fontaine, supra note 1, at 35-36 (discussing Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1996)). 
21. Id. at 36-37 (discussing State v. Mauricio, 568 A.2d 879 (NJ. 1990) ). 
t 
r 
t 
s 
t 
t 
1 
'· 
a 
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killing from murder to manslaughter. This is clearly a failed justifi-
cation doctrine and it does not mean that the defendant is partially 
excused. 
It is coherent to think that people who honestly but unreasona-
bly act for justificatory reasons are less culpable than those who act 
from selfish motives. Consequently, the potential for establishing 
provocation/passion in cases of unreasonable mistake is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the justification version of the doctrine. I 
believe that Professor Fontaine incorrectly concludes that consid-
ering the case of honest but unreasonable mistaken provocation as 
a partial justification "must necessarily be quite confused. "22 
The same problem bedevils Professor Fontaine's analysis of the 
transferred intent cases in which the defendant intends to kill the 
provoker but accidentally kills a third party. The cases he cites, 
Paredei
3 and Stewart (for the killing of the fetus), 24 grant the mitiga-
tion on the ground of reduced rationality because they have 
already made the normative judgment that provocation/passion is 
a partial excuse. One could logically reach the same result if the 
doctrine were a partial justification, however. Fully justified defen-
dants sometimes do kill innocent third parties, but they are still 
acquitted if they acted with reasonable care under the circum-
stances. Again, there is disagreement about whether such initially 
justified defendants are justified or excused when they kill inno-
cent third parties. For the reasons I gave previously, I firmly believe 
that they are justified if they acted with all the care one could rea-
sonably expect under the circumstances. If one takes this position, 
which, again, is a reasonable normative choice, then permitting 
provocation/passion in accidental transferred intent cases is con-
sistent with the partial justification version of the doctrine. 
Professor Fontaine correctly observes that Stewart, which miti-
gates the killing of a non-provoker, is based on an excuse theory 
and is inconsistent with the justification version. All this means, 
however, is that the Minnesota Supreme Court made the prior 
normative choice to treat the doctrine as a partial excuse, a choice 
buttressed by the support it derived from the Model Penal Code's 
EMED mitigation. If the court had made the coherent judgment 
that provocation/passion was best understood as a partial justifica-
tion, it would simply have come out the other way. Stewart and the 
Model Penal Code do not stand for the logical conclusion that 
22. ld. at 37. 
23. Id. at 38 (discussing People v. Paredes, No. B182323, 2007 WL 3015696 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Oct. 17, 2007)). 
24. Id. at 38-40 (discussing State v. Stewart, 624 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 2001) ). 
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common law provocation/passion analytically must be a partial 
excuse. 
Based on his doctrinal exegesis, Professor Fontaine reaches the 
following conclusion: 
[I]f the doctrine were one of justification ... , it would neces-
sarily mean that these courts, the corr~sponding statutory law, 
and the MPC all have heat of passion -dead wrong, as heat of 
passion can only be argued to be a partial justification, or 
have a justification component, where there exists serious 
• 25 provocatiOn .... 
As we have seen, however, this conclusion does not follow and the 
citation of the Model Penal Code is inapt. Fontaine further con-
cludes that provocation/passion cannot be a partial justification 
because it does not .imply that the act is acceptable. This conclu-
sion also does not follow. If provocation/passion is a partial 
justification, then it is a claim that a killing in these circumstances 
is less wrong and more acceptable than if there were no or inade-
quate provocation deserving of a return. It does not mean that the 
killing is acceptable. Denying this possibility simply begs the ques-
tion against the partial justification version and does not 
analytically demonstrate that the doctrine must be a partial excuse. 
To further support his position, Professor Fontaine argues that 
justified action always involves the prevention of uryust harm. This 
is true in theory, but it fails to address those cases in which the de-
fendant was reasonably mistaken and no unjust harm was 
prevented. If these cases are treated as full or failed justification, 
which is a completely open question, then Fontaine's argument 
does not go through. He can save this point by limiting justifica-
tions to cases in which the agent is genuinely motivated by the 
desire to prevent further harm, but this will not save the analytic 
point Fontaine attempts to make.26 If the agent is properly moti-
vated, the reasonable mistake might still coherently be treated as 
justification. Moreover, some theories of justification are based on 
the view that the initial wrongdoer does deserve what the justified 
agent gives the wrongdoer (albeit we do prefer due process, if pos-
25. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
26. Professor Fontaine also does not address the appropriate legal response to an 
agent who acts for an unjustifiable reason, but who luckily prevents unjust harm. These 
cases, too, divide commentators, but the ground for dispute is normative and not analytic. 
i 
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sible, rather than individual action) and they are not based on the 
prevention of further unjust harm. 27 
Suppose, however, that the law rejects this theory of justification, 
which would be a normative choice, and always requires a motive 
to prevent further unjust harm for the usual affirmative defense 
justifications. Doing so would not entail that the criminal law was 
incoherent or inconsistent, however, if it adopted a partially justifi-
catory rationale in cases of serious provocation based on retributive 
support for provocation/passion. 
Professor Fontaine next argues that an egregiously provoked 
agent who reacts with less than deadly violence might have a partial 
or complete excuse, but that no justification would be permitted. 
He cites no support for this position, it is not clear what the excuse 
would be, and I am not sure that he is correct. Suppose a defen-
dant catches his partner after an act of adultery that has clearly just 
occurred. Even though neither of the offending parties is threaten-
ing the injured spouse and no further adulterous act is likely (and 
perhaps is not possible) at that moment, what would be the law's 
response if the injured spouse punched one or both of the adul-
terous couple extremely hard? I am reasonably sure that no 
prosecutor would prosecute unless the resulting injuries were ex-
ceptionally severe. Even if the in jured spouse were prosecuted, I 
am also confident that almost no jury would convict the defendant 
of criminal battery. These are simply sociological speculations, 
however. 
What is the right legal result? No standard justification applies, 
but suppose a trial court decided to give instructions on a potential 
full or partial defense based on some type of provocation theory. 
Would it be based on a justification, an excuse, or a mixed ac-
count? All would be coherent. Again, the conclusion would rest on 
a normative choice. 
Professor Fontaine addresses the case in which the defendant 
acted to prevent further harm, but deadly force was unnecessary. If 
the belief that deadly force was necessary is reasonable, the defen-
dant is fully acquitted. Full acquittal can be completely justified by 
a full justification theory as I suggested above. Here Fontaine 
seems to be taking sides in the debate about why we acquit such 
defendants. He terms the full justification theory a "mistake"28 and 
suggests that full acquittal would be based on a mixed theory of 
27. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND 
THE LAW ON TRIAL 27-29, 145 (1988). 
28. Fontaine, supra note l, at 42. 
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partial justification and partial excuse.29 This demonstrates Profes-
sor Fontaine's apparent acceptance of the possibility of mixed 
justification/excuse doctrines. More important, however, is that 
the suggestion is unsupported by any normative argument. If the 
defendant's honest belief is unreasonable, he is partially justified, 
as Fontaine concedes.30 
Professor Fontaine is right that most jurisdictions do not accept 
a partial defense of self-defense with excessive force, but that is be-
side the point. In all cases in which provocation/passion is raised, 
the defendant has used excessive force. Let us assume with Profes-
sor Fontaine that a partial defense might be possible if the 
provocation/ passion defendant acts with the honest but unrea-
sonably mistaken belief that he has been seriously wronged by the 
provocation. The provocation/passion defendant knows that he is 
not in deadly danger, but if we accept the partial justification ver-
sion of provocation/passion, he receives the reduced conviction of 
manslaughter because he acted for a justificatory motive. The same 
argument that supports a partial justification theory of imperfect 
self-defense or of honest but unreasonable mistake about justifica-
tion can be used to support a partial justification version of 
provocation/passion. Whether one accepts this argument is a 
normative choice. 
The argument from "perversity" is another support for Professor 
Fontaine's claim that provocation/passion must be a partial ex-
cuse. If the doctrine is a partial justification, he argues, then the 
provocation-resistant person is at a disadvantage because he must 
act in the heat of passion to obtain the mitigation. Thus, those 
people who are generally better controlled are punished more. 
This is also true, of course, if provocation/passion is treated as a 
partial excuse. There is no greater perversity if provoca-
tion/passion is a partial justification if the heat of passion is an 
epistemological proxy for acting for a retaliatory reason or if the 
mixed theory of the doctrine is accepted. Either the provoked de-
fendant did not act for the right reason or he lacked one of the 
two necessary but only jointly sufficient criteria-heat of passion. 
Professor Fontaine is correct that the agent's motive is crucial to 
the justification for affirmative defenses. He is also correct; as an 
29. ld. at 44 n.56. 
30. This concession is in some tension with the view that the imperfect self-defender 
who honestly believes that he is acting in self-defense is not even partially justified and can-
not be said to be defending himself at all. Id. at 45 n.58. Of course the defendant is 
motivated by the belief that he needs to defend himself. To claim otherwise is to adopt a 
fully objective view of justification that is inconsistent with ordinary language. This view can 
be coherent, but it is a normative choice that must be supported by an argument. 
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interpretive matter, that provocation/passion is understood as a 
partial affirmative defense even in those jurisdictions that confus-
ingly and technically treat the absence of provocation/passion as 
an element of malice that makes a killing a murder.31 The question 
is what motive we wish to credit. Professor Fontaine and I do not 
wish to valorize the desire to retaliate against a person who has se-
riously provoked another, but that is a normative choice about how 
to assess culpability. It is not an analytic truth ·about what might be 
a partial defense to a provoked killing. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Fontaine and I agree that the common law provoca-
tion/passion doctrine should be interpreted as a partial excuse and 
that its various legal ramifications should be consistent with that 
interpretation. We part company, however, when he claims that the 
doctrine analytically must be a partial excuse and that proponents 
of the partial justification version rest their case on illogic. His ar-
guments for the partial excuse version, and the sources he cites in 
support, already explicitly or implicitly presuppose rejecting the 
partial justification view and accepting the partial excuse version. 
Nowhere does he argue for the presupposition or for the excuse 
view of failed justification that he uses as support. The argument 
for partial excuse is normative and not analytic if one accepts the 
coherent premises of the justification theorists. It's all normativity, 
all the way down. 
31. This narrow, technical point allowed the Supreme Court to permit placing the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant to establish EMED even though it had earlier ruled 
that the prosecution bore the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt to negate 
provocation/passion in jurisdictions that treated absence of provocation/passion as part of 
malice. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding Maine had burden of 
persuasion to negate malice), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (finding New 
York EMED doctrine was clearly a partial affirmative defense and burden of persuasion 
could be shifted to defendant). 
